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I. PLAINTIFFS’ SUIT SHOULD BE DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
 
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable. 
 
1.  Deferred action is a discretionary determination not to pursue removal 
proceedings against an alien for a temporary period of time—a paradigmatic exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.  Such a decision by an agency “not to exercise its 
enforcement authority” is a core exercise of executive power that is presumptively not 
subject to judicial review.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985).  Plaintiffs do 
not dispute that a third party lacks standing “to contest the policies of the prosecuting 
authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”  
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).  Nor do plaintiffs dispute that 
private persons “have no judicially cognizable interest in procuring enforcement of 
the immigration laws.”  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984).  And 
plaintiffs do not dispute that exercises of enforcement discretion regarding 
immigration—where the removal authority is uniquely and exclusively federal and 
may implicate foreign policy—are particularly ill-suited for judicial review.  See Mathews 
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).   
These undisputed principles foreclose plaintiffs’ suit.  States cannot establish a 
justiciable claim by complaining that enforcement discretion has been exercised 
regarding other persons.  Whether brought by an individual or a State, such a 
complaint amounts—at best—to a “generalized grievance” that does not give rise to a 
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justiciable case or controversy.  Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(Jones, J., concurring). 
2.  Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent these principles by arguing that the 2014 
Guidance is not enforcement discretion but rather reviewable agency action because 
deferred action confers “lawful presence, work authorization, and other benefits.”  Br. 
1, 13.  But many other exercises of prosecutorial discretion have similarly significant 
immigration or eligibility consequences.  These collateral consequences do not render 
the exercise of enforcement discretion reviewable.  For example, the enforcement 
decision to pursue certain types of criminal defendants through drug courts rather 
than trials and incarceration allows defendants to obtain valuable benefits from the 
government, such as intensive substance abuse treatment, mental health counseling, 
and medical or therapeutic care.  See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code 123.001-009.  Similarly, 
prosecutorial decisions to pursue misdemeanor rather than felony charges may allow 
defendants to remain eligible for federally subsidized housing, see 42 U.S.C. 13661(c), 
for certain occupation licenses, see Tex. Occ. Code 53.021, for government 
contracting, see Federal Acquisition Regulation 9.406-2, or to possess a firearm, see 18 
U.S.C. 922(g)(1).  And choosing what criminal charges to pursue can have dramatic 
immigration consequences because obtaining a conviction on certain charges, and not 
prosecuting for an available aggravated felony or crime involving moral turpitude, can 
allow the defendant to remain lawfully in the country rather than becoming subject to 
removal.  See 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A).  
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If an Executive decision to defer enforcement may be challenged—and, as 
here, enjoined—whenever it results in collateral benefits for the non-prosecuted party, 
all manner of exercises of prosecutorial discretion could become vulnerable to 
litigation challenges.  But Linda R.S., which itself involved a suit predicated on the 
collateral consequence of a non-enforcement decision, forecloses this theory.   
3. Moreover, even if plaintiffs only challenged the conferral of “benefits,” their 
claims would remain nonjusticiable.  Just as third parties generally lack standing to 
challenge the exercise of prosecutorial discretion against another, third parties 
generally lack standing to challenge the conferral of benefits upon another.  See 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006). 
Plaintiffs assert that deferred action under the 2014 Guidance confers the 
benefit of lawful presence on aliens. See Br. 20-21.  To the extent plaintiffs complain 
that an alien accorded deferred action can remain in the country during the period 
that enforcement action is deferred, that simply reflects the nature of enforcement 
discretion.  Thus, plaintiffs challenge an inherent attribute of deferred action, not a 
separate “benefit,” grant of lawful immigration status, or legal entitlement to remain 
in the country.  And to the extent plaintiffs refer to tolling of unlawful presence under 
the INA’s entry and departure bars to admissibility, see 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B) & (C), 
they have not even alleged that lawful presence, as distinct from the decision to 
accord deferred action, causes them harm.  Plaintiffs have similarly failed to allege 
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harm flowing from the possibility of advance parole or eligibility for Social Security, 
Medicare, or the like.  These are generalized grievances. 
Plaintiffs also cannot evade the bar to judicial challenges of enforcement 
discretion by pointing to the fact that deferred action makes an alien eligible to apply 
for employment authorization, and that authorized employment may eventually 
establish downstream eligibility for benefits such as Social Security and Medicare.  
This Court has expressly held that the Secretary’s decision to approve an alien for 
employment authorization “has been committed to agency discretion by law” and is 
not subject to judicial review.  Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir. 1990).  
Thus, an attempt to challenge the approval of employment authorization for aliens 
accorded deferred action would not be reviewable in its own right.  It follows that the 
possibility of an approval of employment authorization cannot provide the basis for 
reviewing the exercise of deferred enforcement action. 
B.  Plaintiffs Lack Article III Standing. 
 
1. Texas’s Subsidization Of Driver’s Licenses Does Not Support Standing. 
 
a. Having chosen to grant driver’s licenses to all aliens with employment 
authorization and to subsidize those licenses, Texas cannot claim standing on the 
ground that the 2014 Guidance will increase the number of aliens with employment 
authorization and thereby increase the subsidy.  Any costs to Texas are not fairly 
traceable to the Guidance; they result from Texas’s own policy choices.  The then-
Governor of Texas acknowledged this point shortly after the announcement of the 
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2012 DACA guidelines.  He explained that the Texas “legislature has passed laws that 
reflect the policy choices that they believe are right for Texas” and that DACA “does 
not undermine or change our state laws” or “change our obligations” to establish 
eligibility for state benefits.  ROA.4079.  Presumably, Texas chooses to subsidize 
driver’s licenses for aliens with employment authorization because it believes that is 
the appropriate policy for Texas.  If the State now believes otherwise, it can change its 
laws accordingly.   
In Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976), the Court held that 
Pennsylvania lacked standing to challenge a New Jersey tax that triggered a tax credit 
in Pennsylvania and thereby reduced Pennsylvania’s tax revenue.  The Court explained 
that any harm to Pennsylvania resulted from decisions of its own legislature and 
“nothing prevents Pennsylvania from withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to New 
Jersey.” Id. at 664.  By the same token, Texas is free to change its driver’s licensing 
policies in response to the 2014 Guidance.  Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451 
(1992), which held that Wyoming could challenge an Oklahoma law that “directly 
affect[ed] Wyoming’s ability to collect severance tax revenues,” differs from cases like 
Pennsylvania and this one where a State’s claimed injury is triggered by the plaintiff 
State’s own law. 
The federal government does not contend, as plaintiffs insist, that “any element 
of choice” available to a plaintiff to avoid an injury defeats standing.  Br. 27, 32.  
Rather, standing cannot be predicated on an indirect, adverse consequence to a 
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plaintiff of another party’s actions when the consequences are due to the plaintiff’s 
own, independent policy choices.  Far from “unprecedented,” Br. 29, this principle is 
well accepted.  See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. Surface Transp. Bd., 457 F.3d 
24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Petro-Chem Processing, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
Plaintiffs suggest that because many States grant driver’s licenses to aliens with 
federal employment authorization, the federal government’s broadening of the class 
of aliens who may request deferred action—and thereby potentially become eligible 
for employment authorization—impinges on state sovereignty.  But, having chosen to 
rely on a federal classification for providing a state benefit, a State cannot claim an 
injury fairly traceable to the federal government whenever the federal government 
alters the classification in a way that increases costs under state law. Most States, for 
example, borrow the federal definition of “adjusted gross income” to compute state 
income taxes.  See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.  43-1001(2).  It is inconceivable that a State 
could sue the federal government if the IRS issued a revenue ruling that lowered AGI 
and thereby incidentally decreased state income-tax revenues.  Moreover, in 
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court recognized that a State’s decision to change its laws 
would avoid an injury rather than cause one.  See 426 U.S. at 664.   
Relying on Arizona DREAM Act Coalition v. Brewer (ADAC), 757 F.3d 1053, 
1067 (9th Cir. 2014), plaintiffs assert that Texas may be unable to deny driver’s 
licenses to aliens accorded deferred action.  Br. 29.  But—unlike Arizona in ADAC—
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Texas has not enacted a law to deny driver’s licenses to aliens accorded deferred 
action, and it is entirely speculative whether Texas would enact such a law or what 
form it might take.  Given that there is no ripe controversy concerning preemption of 
any law Texas might enact in the future, this Court should not entertain this suit, 
where standing rests on speculation about whether Texas may change its state laws.   
In any event, Texas is free to eliminate the subsidies about which it complains.  
Texas could decline to subsidize the costs of all state driver’s licenses.  Or it could 
decline to subsidize the costs of its “temporary visitor” licenses, which include 
licenses granted to DACA and DAPA recipients, on the ground that Texas will not 
recoup the full benefits of subsidization from a temporary resident who lacks a long-
term connection to the State.  See Driver Licenses and ID Cards for Temporary 
Visitors, https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/DriverLicense/limitedTerm.  These options, 
among various others, would not run afoul of federal preemption principles because 
they rely on classifications “borrowed from federal law and further[ing] a substantial 
state purpose.”  ROA.1312.  By contrast, in ADAC, Arizona identified no legitimate 
purpose to support its refusal to issue driver’s licenses to DACA recipients.  757 F.3d 
at 1067.  Notably, Arizona did not invoke cost as a basis for denying licenses to 
DACA recipients, and ADAC did not address state subsidies. 
b. Plaintiffs’ argument also fails to account for the countervailing fiscal benefits 
to States, including Texas, that will result from the 2014 Guidance. The benefits of 
the Guidance—estimated at $338 million over five years in Texas alone, ROA.2473—
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will more than offset any estimated increase to the State in driver’s license costs. 
Plaintiffs dismiss the financial benefits of the 2014 Guidance as “speculative” 
and suggest that they have been exaggerated.  Br. 37.  But plaintiffs bear the burden of 
establishing a concrete, non-speculative injury traceable to defendants, see Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583 (1992), and they have failed to offer any reason 
to doubt that the 2014 Guidance will lead to substantial financial benefits for States. 
See Amicus Br. of State of Washington, et al. at 8-10; see also Inst. on Taxation & 
Economic Policy, Undocumented Immigrants’ State & Local Tax Contributions 2 (April 
2015) (econometric study estimating that DACA and DAPA would increase state and 
local tax contributions “by an estimated $845 million a year once fully in place”). 
Plaintiffs insist that the 2014 Guidance would cause Texas an Article III injury 
even if it produces financial benefits that offset its costs.  Br. 36.  But Henderson, 287 
F.3d at 379, provides that standing is lacking where benefits to the plaintiff from the 
defendant’s conduct “offset [its] administrative costs.”  Plaintiffs claim that Henderson 
is limited to the “unique doctrine of taxpayer standing,” Br. 36, but nothing about 
Henderson’s reasoning is confined to that setting.  A plaintiff cannot be said to suffer 
an economic injury from conduct that financially benefits it.  The decisions cited by 
plaintiffs generally involve benefits that otherwise accrue to a plaintiff from its 
relationship with the defendant, not benefits that flow from the action being 
challenged.  
c. Plaintiffs’ attempt to establish an injury by relying on the incidental, 
      Case: 15-40238      Document: 00513047024     Page: 16     Date Filed: 05/18/2015
9 
 
downstream effects of federal immigration policies is boundless. If Texas can claim an 
Article III injury based on its driver’s-license theory, States could likewise claim an 
injury to enjoin approval of employment authorization for any alien on any basis.  For 
example, a State could challenge the federal government’s determination to grant 
parole, asylum, or temporary protected status to citizens of a foreign country during a 
crisis, so long as the State could establish a likelihood that some (or even one) of 
those aliens would choose to reside in the State and apply for a driver’s license.  Such 
would contravene the federal government’s exclusive power over immigration, and 
could interfere with sensitive foreign-policy and national-security judgments.  See 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012); FAIR, Inc. v. Reno, 93 F.3d 897, 
901 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (regional effects of U.S. agreement with Cuba to parole 20,000 
Cubans annually were not within INA zone of interests).  Taken to its logical 
conclusion, this theory could permit States to challenge any federal action or policy if 
it might have the incidental consequence of prompting an individual to move to a 
State or triggering a service provided by state law.  Such a boundless theory of 
standing would transform the federal courts into a venue for political disputes rather 
than concrete cases or controversies. 
2.  Plaintiffs’ Educational and Law Enforcement Expenditures Do Not Support 
Standing.  
 
This Court’s decision in Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1997), 
forecloses Plaintiffs’ claim that they have standing on the theory that the 2014 
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Guidance will cause them to incur increased law-enforcement and social-services 
expenses.  Texas held that state costs associated with providing educational, medical, 
and penal services to unlawfully present aliens are not attributable to the federal 
government’s enforcement policies.  In the course of rejecting a Tenth Amendment 
claim, the Court made clear that costs of providing services to aliens result from the 
States’ own laws and their duties under the Constitution, not federal immigration 
policies.  See id.  
Plaintiffs’ claimed injury from such costs also fails factually.  Plaintiffs cannot 
establish that the 2014 Guidance will attract new aliens to their States.  The district 
court correctly found that magnet theory “too attenuated” to confer standing.  
ROA.4431. Plaintiffs have not shown, and offer no reason to believe, that new 
immigrants will unlawfully enter the United States because of policies from which newly 
arrived aliens are expressly excluded.  And the hypothetical possibility that some aliens 
might misunderstand the 2014 Guidance and immigrate illegally based on that 
misunderstanding is not fairly traceable to defendants.   
Nor can it be assumed the 2014 Guidance will lead to an increased number of 
aliens in the plaintiff States by causing DHS to remove fewer aliens.  Because the 
Guidance is intended to help DHS focus its limited resources on protecting the 
border and removing aliens most likely to commit crimes, the Guidance will make 
DHS enforcement more effective, not less.  And the reallocation of DHS resources 
will facilitate the removal of immigrants that impose a greater financial burden on the 
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States.  Cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 2015).  Even assuming that the 
2014 Guidance will cause some aliens not to leave the country, the States make no 
showing that the costs associated with any such aliens will outweigh the substantial 
savings that will result from DHS’s enhanced focus on border security and public 
safety. 
3.  Plaintiffs Cannot Assert Parens Patriae Standing Against the Federal Government. 
 
As explained in the federal government’s opening brief, a “State does not have 
standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government” on behalf 
of its residents.  Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 
n.16 (1982); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923).  Plaintiffs 
concede they lack standing to bring suit to protect their residents from federal law, but 
contend they may bring suit on their residents’ behalf to force the federal government 
to comply with (their view of) federal law.  Br. 37.  That is a distinction without a 
difference.  In any event, plaintiffs’ theory assumes that employers will violate federal 
law (see 29 U.S.C. 218c(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)) by discriminating against residents of 
their States who are U.S. citizens receiving tax credits under the Affordable Care Act 
in favor of aliens accorded deferred action who are not eligible for tax credits.  Courts 
refuse to “presume illegal activities on the part of actors not before the court” in 
order to find standing.  Tel. and Data Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
C. Plaintiffs Have No Cause Of Action. 
 
 Plaintiffs seek relief under the APA, but the APA’s cause of action, 5 U.S.C.  
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702(a), is unavailable if the “plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or 
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be 
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit,” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 
388, 399 (1987), or if the relevant statute expressly or impliedly precludes judicial 
review, Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345-52 (1984).   
1.  Plaintiffs’ interests here are not within the zone of interests of the INA 
(including the unauthorized employment statute, 8 U.S.C. 1324a) and thus plaintiffs 
have no cause of action.  FAIR, 93 F.3d at 901; Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014). Plaintiffs suggest that anyone who 
would comment is within the zone of interests of the rulemaking provisions of the 
APA.  But “Congress, in adopting the APA, had no such universal standing in mind.”  
Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  
Rather, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the APA’s notice-and-comment 
requirements must demonstrate that he comes within the zone of interests protected 
by the underlying substantive statute the challenged rule implements.  Mendoza v. Perez, 
754 F.3d 1002, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014); cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8. 
 Plaintiffs cannot bring themselves within the zone of interests of the INA by 
focusing on benefits they claim will accrue to aliens accorded deferred action.  A 
third-party does not generally have a protected interest in whether someone else is 
awarded benefits.  See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 338.  Here, most of what plaintiffs 
list as benefits are programs funded by the federal government, not the States.  And 
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even if plaintiffs could identify a direct interest in an alien’s eligibility for such 
programs, they can point to nothing in the INA that purports to afford States a right 
to challenge determinations by the Secretary that might affect such eligibility.   
 The financial consequences cited by plaintiffs are not part of deferred action, 
but are potential consequences of the Secretary’s decision to approve employment 
authorization.  Plaintiffs’ interests in not subsidizing driver’s licenses for those 
accorded deferred action are far outside any zone of interests of the employment 
authorization statute, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3), even assuming a third party could ever 
challenge an approval of employment authorization under this provision.  Texas’s 
driver’s-license subsidies are tied to employment authorization solely because of 
Texas’s own choice.  As noted above, this Court held in Perales that employment 
authorization decisions are committed to the Secretary’s discretion by law.  And the 
INA broadly prohibits review of decisions committed to the Secretary’s discretion by 
statute.  8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
The importance of federal immigration policies to States does not mean that 
Congress intended to authorize States to challenge those policies in court.   Federal 
decisions whether to admit aliens into the United States or to permit them to remain 
have important consequences for the Nation as a whole, including the Nation’s 
foreign affairs.  That is precisely why the “responsibility for regulating the relationship 
between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political 
branches of the Federal Government.”  Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81.  State suits seeking to 
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overturn federal immigration policies invite judicial intrusion into matters committed 
to Congress and the discretion of the Executive Branch.  As is illustrated by the sharp 
divisions between the plaintiff States and the non-party amicus States that support 
implementation of the 2014 Guidance, such suits place courts in the position of 
adjudicating disagreements over national immigration policy.  And they pose a 
substantial risk of interfering with the United States’ ability to speak with one voice on 
matters that “may affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the 
entire Nation.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498; cf. Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 191 
(D.D.C. 2014), appeal pending, No. 14-5325 (D.C. Cir.) (argued May 4, 2015),. 
 2.  The INA reinforces the Heckler v. Chaney principle that decisions about 
whether to undertake enforcement action are presumptively committed to the 
relevant agency’s discretion and not subject to judicial review.  The INA expressly 
provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on 
behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the [Secretary] to commence 
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.”  8 U.S.C. 1252(g).  This 
provision is “aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts” by 
precluding “attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.”  
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti- Discrimination Comm. (AAADC), 525 U.S. 471, 485-86 & n.9 
(1999).    
 Plaintiffs argue that section 1252(g) applies to bar suits only by aliens, and that 
congressional intent to preclude review at the behest of States or other third parties 
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cannot be implied in light of the general presumption of judicial review.  Br. at 40.   
But “[t]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is just that—a 
presumption.”  Block, 467 U.S. at 349; Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1993).  It can 
be rebutted by clear indications that Congress intended to foreclose review.  Mach 
Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015); Block, 467 U.S. at 351; United 
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 446-49 (1988). 
 Here, the INA expressly precludes suit by the parties subject to an enforcement 
action.  It contains no provision expressly authorizing suit by States or any other third 
party.  It operates in an area—the exercise of enforcement discretion—that is 
presumptively unreviewable and that the Constitution commits to the Executive 
Branch.  And it concerns decisions that are suffused with broad administrative 
discretion at every stage.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.  Nothing in the text or structure 
of the INA suggests a congressional intent to permit States to intrude into this area.   
II.     PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED A LIKELIHOOD 
OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS. 
  
A. The Secretary’s 2014 Guidance Is Exempt From Notice-and-
Comment Rulemaking.  
 
 Plaintiffs’ contention that the 2014 Guidance must be promulgated through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking mischaracterizes its terms, purpose, and practical 
application.  The 2014 Guidance establishes guidelines for the discretionary exercise 
of the Secretary’s power to determine whether to pursue removal of an alien from the 
United States.  Such guidelines for the allocation and focus of an agency’s enforce-
      Case: 15-40238      Document: 00513047024     Page: 23     Date Filed: 05/18/2015
16 
 
ment resources are not legislative rules and thus are not subject to notice-and-
comment rulemaking.  Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1152 n.13 (5th 
Cir. 1984); American Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
   1.  Plaintiffs argue that the 2014 Guidance establishes a new program awarding 
aliens new legal rights and entitlements, and claim that it therefore must comply with 
the notice-and comment requirements of the APA.  This characterization of the 
Guidance is wrong, and even if it were correct, it would not support plaintiffs’ claim. 
 The 2014 Guidance does not grant government benefits to aliens.  An alien 
accorded deferred action is not thereby entitled to a check for Social Security benefits 
or a Medicare card for hospital insurance.  Deferred action enables an alien to apply 
for employment authorization, and if authorization is obtained, to seek lawful 
employment, pay taxes, and accrue lawful income and employment history needed to 
eventually qualify for such benefits.  But employment authorization for aliens 
accorded deferred action is expressly authorized by a 1981 regulation that was 
promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking.  See 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).   
Although lawful employment is a necessary step in establishing eligibility for Social 
Security and other benefits, the 2014 Guidance, unlike the agency action at issue in 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), does not establish eligibility criteria for such 
programs.  Rather, eligibility turns on numerous other requirements established by 
and peculiar to each program under preexisting laws and regulations.    
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Although aliens accorded deferred action are lawfully present for a certain 
period in the sense that the government has determined not to seek their removal 
during the term of deferred action, that is very different from a grant of lawful 
immigration status or legal entitlement to remain in the United States.  That 
distinction is nothing new to immigration law.  “Unlawful presence and unlawful 
status are distinct concepts” and “[i]t is entirely possible for aliens to be lawfully 
present (i.e., in a ‘period of stay authorized by the Attorney General’) even though 
their lawful status has expired.” Chaudhry v. Holder, 705 F.3d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 2013).  
Numerous categories of aliens who are considered to have lawful presence, including 
all aliens accorded deferred action, are nonetheless not in lawful status.  5 Gordon, 
Mailer, & Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure 63.10[c][2], at 63-129 (2014)  
Deferred action does not cure or excuse prior immigration law violations, render the 
alien lawfully admitted, or afford the alien lawful immigration status.1 
                                                 
1 The Secretary has statutory authority to grant advance parole to any alien applying 
for admission (other than a refugee) for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 
public benefit,” allowing the alien to leave and reenter the country.  8 U.S.C. 
1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. 212.5(f).   An alien who leaves and returns to the United 
States under a grant of advance parole is not making a departure under the 
immigration laws and hence does not trigger the three- or ten-year bars to 
admissibility that may apply.  See ROA 496-498; 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B); see also 8 
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (allowing the Secretary to waive the bar for qualifying aliens 
based on extreme hardship).  For aliens who previously entered the United States 
unlawfully and who now qualify for an immigrant visa under the INA, parole would 
remove one impediment to applying for that visa through “adjustment of status” in 
the United States (rather than consular processing overseas), because the alien would 
have been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.”  8 U.S.C. 
1255(a)(1).  Deferred action does not entitle an alien to advance parole, and neither 
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 Furthermore, even if the 2014 Guidance did confer Social Security or similar 
benefits on aliens (which it does not), that would not render it subject to notice-and-
comment requirements.  To the contrary, the APA expressly exempts from notice-
and-comment rulemaking matters relating to “benefits” and “grants.”  5 U.S.C. 
553(a)(2).  This exception is not, as plaintiffs contend, Br. 42, limited to “public 
benefits” or benefits in which the government has a proprietary interest.  The plain 
language does not contain such limitation, and the construction urged by plaintiffs 
was rejected long ago by the D.C. Circuit. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Snow, 561 F.2d 227, 
231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 Finally, the Secretary did not need to issue the 2014 Guidance to establish legal 
authority to defer removals.  As plaintiffs acknowledge, one indicium of whether a 
rule establishes new substantive rights or obligations (and thus amounts to a legislative 
rule subject to notice-and comment) is whether the agency would have legal authority 
to undertake the relevant action without first promulgating an enabling rule.  Br. 43 
(citing Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 
1993)).  Deferred action is a practice reflected in longstanding regulations, see 8 C.F.R. 
274a.12(c)(14), and recognized by the Supreme Court as an appropriate exercise of the 
Executive’s removal discretion.  See AAADC, 525 U.S. at 483-84; see also Matter of 
Quintero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 348, 350 (B.I.A. 1982) (“the prosecutorial discretion 
                                                                                                                                                             
deferred action nor advance parole creates any entitlement to lawful immigration 
status or an immigrant visa.  
      Case: 15-40238      Document: 00513047024     Page: 26     Date Filed: 05/18/2015
19 
 
exercised in granting deferred action status is committed exclusively to the Service 
enforcement officials”).  The legal authority to defer removal action thus exists 
without the 2014 Guidance.  
  2. Plaintiffs argue that even if the 2014 Guidance is properly understood as a 
general policy for exercise of enforcement discretion, it is still a legislative rule subject 
to notice and comment because it allows no discretion and establishes final 
constraints on the Secretary’s enforcement decisions.  Br. 45-46. This contention is 
inconsistent with Circuit precedent and unsupported by the record below. 
 a. In Crane, 783 F.3d at 254-55, this Court held that the 2014 Guidance does not 
preclude the agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion.  It reasoned that the 2014 
Guidance makes clear that immigration officials retain discretion to institute or defer a 
removal action on the basis of a case-by-case evaluation of an alien’s individual 
circumstances.  That discretion makes the 2014 Guidance a quintessential statement 
of policy exempt from notice and comment. 
 Plaintiffs assert that Crane is inconsistent with the evidentiary record here and 
therefore is not binding.  Br. 24-25.  But whether the 2014 Guidance vests 
immigration officers with case-by-case discretion is largely, if not exclusively, a legal 
issue rather than a factual one, and Crane establishes the law of the Circuit on this 
point.  Moreover, the “new” evidence on which plaintiffs and the district court rely 
pertains to implementation of the 2012 DACA policy, not the 2014 Guidance 
challenged here.  And in any event, the record here demonstrates that requests for 
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deferred action under the 2012 DACA policy were denied for discretionary reasons.  
See ROA.4146-4149.  The district court in Arpaio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 193-94, citing 
similar evidence, concluded that discretionary, case-by-case review is permitted and 
does occur under the 2012 DACA policy.  And although a high proportion of 
deferred action requests under that policy have been approved, that merely reflects 
what logic and common sense would predict—that aliens whose circumstances weigh 
against deferred action are unlikely to identify themselves to DHS by requesting 
deferred action in the first instance. 
   b.  Even if the 2014 Guidance were deemed to impose significant constraints 
on agency discretion, that would not suffice to make it a legislative rule requiring 
notice and comment.  Legislative rules are those that have a significant effect on the 
legal rights or obligations of third parties.  Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 
F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 1983).  Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, “agency instructions 
to agency officers are not legislative rules.”  Kast , 744 F.2d at 1152 n.13.  Thus, the 
key question is not whether instructions to agency officials and subordinates are firm 
or “tentative,” but whether the instructions establish binding norms that regulate the 
prospective conduct of third parties.  The 2014 Guidance merely sets forth internal 
guidelines for the exercise of a discretionary enforcement power.  Such guidelines are 
not legislative rules.  Id. at 1155; Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1050. 
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B.    The 2014 Guidance Is Consistent With The Secretary’s Statutory 
And Constitutional Authority. 
 
 Plaintiffs assert they are likely to succeed on two additional claims on which the 
district court did not rely—first, that the 2014 Guidance exceeds the Secretary’s 
statutory authority, and second, that it violates separation-of-powers principles.  
Neither claim supports the preliminary injunction. 
1.  Deferred Action Under The 2014 Guidance Is Consistent With The INA. 
 
The Secretary’s authority to defer removal of aliens is consistent with 
longstanding practice, Supreme Court precedent, and statutes expressly vesting the 
Secretary with broad discretion to set policies for use of agency resources in enforcing 
the immigration laws.  In AAADC, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]t each stage [of 
the deportation process] the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor,” and 
noted that immigration officials “had been engaging in a regular practice (which has 
come to be known as ‘deferred action’) of exercising that discretion for humanitarian 
reasons or simply for its own convenience.”  525 U.S. at 483-84.  The Court recently 
confirmed that “[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion 
exercised by immigration officials” and that “[f]ederal officials, as an initial matter, 
must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 
2499.  
 Plaintiffs attempt to evade this controlling precedent by mischaracterizing 
deferred action under the 2014 Guidance as an affirmative grant of lawful presence 
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rather than an exercise of enforcement discretion.  But every decision to defer 
removal entails an official determination to countenance the alien’s continued 
presence in the United States unless and until a decision to institute removal 
proceeding is made or deferral is revoked.  Plaintiffs’ contention that such action 
constitutes an impermissible grant of a new immigration status runs contrary to 
AAADC and Arizona as well as longstanding practice.  See p.17, supra. 
 Plaintiffs also assert that the scale of the 2014 Guidance renders it qualitatively 
distinct from prior exercises of enforcement discretion.  But the number of aliens 
potentially eligible to request deferred action under the 2014 Guidance does not make 
it any less a permissible exercise of enforcement discretion.  In the Family Fairness 
program adopted in 1990, the Executive made similar opportunities available to what 
was estimated to be 1.5 million aliens who were not lawfully present.2  See ROA.506.  
The 2014 Guidance is rooted in the same considerations of enforcement priorities, 
resource constraints, and humanitarian considerations as prior exercises of deferred 
action, and the Supreme Court has recognized that such determinations are within the 
Secretary’s statutory authority.  See AAADC, 525 U.S. at 483-84. 
2.  The Secretary Has Broad Discretion To Authorize Employment Of Aliens.  
 
   As noted above, this Court held in Perales that the Secretary’s determinations 
whether to approve employment authorization for aliens are committed to his 
                                                 
2 Plaintiffs argue that “only” 47,000 people actually received relief under the Family 
Fairness program.  More than 1.4 million additional aliens, however, were estimated 
to be eligible for relief but did not apply.  See ROA.506. 
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discretion by law.  903 F.2d at 1045.  Perales is premised on statutory provisions that 
expressly recognize the Secretary’s (formerly the Attorney General’s) authority to 
authorize an alien to work lawfully.  See 8 U.S.C.  1324a(h)(3).  It is also consistent 
with regulations specifically permitting the approval of employment authorization for 
aliens accorded deferred action.   8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).   Plaintiffs attempt to 
distinguish Perales by arguing it is limited to the denial rather than approval of 
employment authorization. Br. 49. But this Court expressly held that “the agency’s 
decision to grant voluntary departure and work authorization has been committed to 
agency discretion by law.”  Perales, 903 F.2d at 1045 (emphasis added).  That holding 
controls here. 
  3.  The 2014 Guidance Is Consistent With The Constitution.  
  In a single paragraph, plaintiffs summarily assert that the 2014 Guidance is 
“incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress” and violates 
separation-of-powers principles. Br. 50 (quotation marks omitted).  This passing 
assertion does not suffice to preserve an argument for appellate review.  Yohey v. 
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).  In any event, plaintiffs’ constitutional 
assertion is nothing more than a recapitulation of their statutory argument, and as 
explained above, that statutory argument is without merit. 
   Several of plaintiffs’ amici attempt to make up for plaintiffs’ failure to press a 
constitutional challenge.  But “[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that an amicus curiae 
generally cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that have not been 
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presented by the parties to the appeal.” Garcia-Melendez v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 657, 662 
n.2 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).  And even if the constitutional 
arguments of the amici were properly before the Court, they are without merit. 
 In particular, the amici err in asserting that the 2014 Guidance violates the 
President’s constitutional responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.” This contention rests on a false dichotomy between enforcement 
discretion and the Take Care Clause.  “The power to decide when to investigate, and 
when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive’s duty to see to the faithful 
execution of the laws . . . .”  Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); accord United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 819 
n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc).  
Thus, enforcement discretion is an integral part of the Take Care duty, not a violation 
of it. 
III.    THE BALANCE OF HARMS FAVORS REVERSAL OF THE 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 
 
As discussed above, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will suffer 
concrete and cognizable harm as a result of the 2014 Guidance, much less irreparable 
harm.  By contrast, the preliminary injunction injures the federal government and 
undermines the public interest in a manner that will not be redressable if and when 
the Guidance is upheld. 
The injunction impedes implementation of a policy that protects homeland and 
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national security by encouraging aliens who are low priorities for removal to identify 
themselves, undergo a background check, and consent to inclusion in a DHS database 
so that immigration officers in the field may quickly identify these aliens.  Plaintiffs 
contend that these same objectives could be accomplished through other, unspecified 
policies.  Br. 52.  But the Secretary has determined that policy embodied in the 2014 
Guidance will best advance the public-safety and border-security priorities established 
by Congress.  Plaintiffs can hardly ask the Court to resolve this case by rejecting the 
Secretary’s expert judgment in favor of their own. 
The injunction also undermines police efforts by discouraging aliens from 
cooperating with law enforcement.  See Amicus Br. of Major Cities Chiefs Ass’n, et al. 
at 5-10.  And it deprives non-party States of significant tax revenues and undermines 
important humanitarian concerns.  See Amicus Br. of State of Wash., et al. at 3-13. 
Moreover, as explained in the federal government’s opening brief, the 
injunction has resulted in intractable administrative burdens.  Plaintiffs dismiss this 
harm as “manufactured” and suggest that the government should have ceased its 
implementation efforts when Texas announced it would bring suit.  Br. 53.  But a 
defendant is under no duty to enjoin itself as soon as a plaintiff seeks an injunction, 
and ceasing preparatory efforts would have made timely implementation of the policy 
impossible in the event no injunction issued.   
Finally, the preliminary injunction imposes the sort of structural harm to the 
federal government that has been deemed irreparable in circumstances strikingly 
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similar to those presented here.  In INS v. Legalization Assistance Project, 510 U.S. 1301 
(1993), Circuit Justice O’Connor granted the federal government a stay where a 
district court had issued an injunction interfering with the government’s execution of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act.  Justice O’Connor explained that the 
injunction was “not merely an erroneous adjudication of a lawsuit between private 
litigants, but an improper intrusion by a federal court into the workings of a 
coordinate branch of the Government.”  Id. at 1306.  It thus presented “an 
exceptional case” in which a stay was proper.  Id. at 1302.  Here too, the district 
court’s preliminary injunction constitutes an extraordinary and erroneous intrusion 
into the workings of the Executive Branch. 
IV.  THE NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS 
OVERBROAD. 
 
Plaintiffs offer no plausible justification for a nationwide injunction that 
unnecessarily harms non-party States who actively support the challenged Executive 
policies.  Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, this objection has not been waived.  The 
federal government opposed a preliminary injunction and objected to its nationwide 
scope in seeking a stay pending appeal as soon as it became clear the district court had 
exceeded its equitable authority. 
 Plaintiffs cite National Mining Association v. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 
1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), for 
the proposition that a single district court must issue nationwide relief when it 
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determines that a regulation is facially invalid.  But Harmon’s discussion of this point is 
dicta.  See id. at 496 n.23  And National Mining involved a suit by trade association 
plaintiffs representing many of the regulated parties, a final determination that the 
challenged regulation was invalid rather than preliminary injunctive relief, and factors 
that could be applicable only to decisions by the D.C. Circuit.  See 145 F.3d at 1409-
10.  None of these considerations is present here. 
  In the absence of a certified nationwide class, the interests in uniform 
application of the immigration laws do not empower a single district court to dictate 
immigration policy for the entire country.  While uniform application of immigration 
laws is important, that principle weighs against entering an injunction at all; it does not 
empower the district court to exceed established limits on equitable relief, override 
interests of non-party States supporting the 2014 Guidance, or arrogate to itself the 
authority to decide nationwide immigration policy. 
 Finally, the notion that the 2014 Guidance must be enjoined throughout the 
nation to save Texas its putative costs of issuing driver’s licenses to aliens residing 
within its borders is untenable.  Texas could unilaterally eliminate these harms simply 
by charging full price for its licenses.  A declaratory judgment would also give Texas a 
basis to deny driver’s licenses under state law, without interfering with the Secretary’s 
discretion under federal law.  An injunction could be tailored to remedy Texas’s 
claimed harm by enjoining deferred action for aliens who live in Texas. 
 While it is conceivable that aliens accorded deferred action in other jurisdic-
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tions may move to Texas, those costs are speculative and apt to be small.  More 
important, they do not warrant divesting other non-party States of the millions of 
dollars they believe will flow from the 2014 Guidance.  An injunction is an equitable 
remedy and so the court is required to consider interests of all affected parties, 
including parties not before the court and the public interest as a whole.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 This Court should vacate the order below and remand with instructions to 
dismiss the case or, in the alternative, should reverse the preliminary injunction or, at 
a minimum, limit its geographic scope. 
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